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Abstract  
How does donor funding affect the independence, role-perceptions and ideology of the journalism 
it supports? We begin to answer this increasingly important but under-researched question with a 
year-long case study of the humanitarian newswire IRIN as it transitioned from being funded by 
the United Nations to a private foundation, run by a Malaysian billionaire. Using content analysis, 
in-depth interviews, and ethnographic research we document the changes that occurred in IRIN’s 
outputs, target audience and public service values and the complex interplay of influences which 
produced these changes. We find that, in this case, donor power operated entirely indirectly and 
always in concert with the dominant professional values within IRIN. In doing so, this case study 
highlights the importance of journalistic agency and contextual variables in the journalist-donor 
relationship, as well as the potential significance of contradictory dynamics. We also use this case 
to test whether Benson, Hesserus and Sedel’s model of media owner power can help to explain the 
workings of donor power.  
 
  
2 
 
Engaging in regular, detailed reporting of global crises such as conflicts, refugee flows and food 
insecurity is not profitable. It rarely helps news outlets attract mass audiences, enter lucrative new 
media markets, or secure advertising from luxury brands (Aly 2015). It is also very expensive to 
fund a network of on-the-ground reporters and the kinds of time-consuming research and travel 
necessary to explain the complex causes and contexts of these crises (Sambrook 2010). For these 
reasons, this kind of news is generally produced by journalistic outlets with a strong commitment 
to public service values, including public education, deliberation and democratic participation 
(Lowe and Stavitsky 2016).  
Finding ways of sustaining loss-making, international public service journalism is 
important because it has the potential to inform and (re)shape the relationships between publics, 
policy-makers and aid practitioners, albeit in complex and non-linear ways (Cottle 2009). 
International public service journalism is particularly important at a time of escalating global need. 
A combination of climate change, economic globalization and conflict mean that nearly two thirds 
of the world’s population are expected to be living in fragile situations by 2030 (OECD 2014).  
The pursuit of such normative commitments within journalism has traditionally been 
enabled by state subsidies, as in the case of national public service broadcasters (PSBs). But at a 
time when many states are cutting back on this financial support and commercial revenues are 
falling, both established and newer digital news outlets with public service commitments have 
begun to accept funding from private foundations in order to subsidise their loss-making 
journalistic work (Bunce 2016; Browne 2010). For example, since 2009, the following news 
organisations have all received grants of at least $1 million from the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation (BMGF) to support international public service journalism: ABC News, 
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AllAfrica.com, Al Jazeera, El País, The Guardian, National Public Radio, PBS’ Newshour and 
Public Radio International.  
But does donor funding really enable journalists to pursue expensive and highly specialised 
forms of public service journalism, whilst protecting them from commercial and political 
pressures? Or do donors exert their own forms of political and economic influence by, for example, 
encouraging journalists to ‘channel… their energies into safe, legalistic, bureaucratic activities and 
mild reformism’ (Feldman 2007:427)? Despite its importance, we know remarkably little about 
the implications of donor funding for journalistic practices or outputs. Research about ‘philanthro-
journalism’ tends to be limited to theoretical critiques or discussion of anecdotal evidence.  
What is needed are systematic studies of news organisations which explore how donor 
funding may affect the content and production of news. This is precisely what this article provides. 
It reports on the findings of a year-long research project about IRIN, an online news agency, 
founded by the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) after the 
Rwandan genocide in 1994 in order to, ‘enhance the capacity of the humanitarian community to 
understand, respond to and avert emergencies’. On 31st December 2014, OCHA closed the project 
following a series of disputes over editorial freedom. On January 1st 2015, IRIN became funded 
primarily by the Jynwel Foundation - the philanthropic arm of the Hong-Kong based international 
private equity investment and advisory firm, Jynwel Capital. Using extensive ethnographic access, 
semi-structured interviews and content analysis, we interrogate how and why changes in IRIN’s 
journalism occurred during their transition to this new donor. 
This research makes a number of contributions to our understanding of the potential power 
and influence of donors. First, we introduce and test a model for investigating the operation of 
donor power, based on Benson, Hesserus and Sedel’s (forthcoming) framework for analysing the 
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power of media owners. Drawing on this model, we find that, central to the operation of donor 
power in this case was the interaction of the donor’s influence over revenue generation, resource 
allocation and target audiences as well as their background in the field of philanthro-capitalism. In 
addition, our case study highlights the importance of both journalistic agency and contextual 
variables in the journalist-donor relationship, which have historically been underemphasised (see 
Feldman 2007; Browne 2010). Finally, our analysis leads us to conclude that the most appropriate 
paradigm of power in this case is that of ‘contradiction’ (Freedman 2014).  
In the first section of this article, we introduce Benson, Hesserus and Sedel’s (forthcoming) 
model of owner power and identify the most likely ways in which donor influences manifest 
themselves in journalistic practices. In the next section, we discuss our methodological strategies 
and the rationale for selecting this case. We then go on, in the findings sections, to describe the 
most significant changes that occurred in IRIN’s journalism before interrogating the principal 
causal factors that produced them. We conclude by considering what wider lessons this case has 
for our understanding of donor power and for future research in this area. 
 
Modes of (d)owner power   
Previous studies of the influence of external stakeholders on the workings of not-for-profit 
organisations commonly make use of stakeholder theory (Freeman 1984). This theory draws 
attention to the potentially conflicting demands of multiple stakeholders (board members, donors, 
governments, beneficiaries) and how managers establish which stakeholder(s) to prioritise in any 
given situation. Seminal work by Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) indicates that stakeholder 
salience involves three principal factors: power, legitimacy and urgency; the successful 
combination of which leads to stakeholders becoming ‘definitive’. For a detailed exploration of 
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IRIN’s management of multiple stakeholders on its board and at partner organisations see (author 
removed).   
In this article, our concern is with the effects on IRIN’s journalism of the interaction of two 
particular groups of stakeholders – those working for IRIN (its managers, staff journalists and 
stringers) and the Jynwel Foundation (including Jho Low and other Foundation representatives). 
In this context, stakeholder analysis is useful for drawing attention to how IRIN managers’ 
strategic decision-making emerged from a process of negotiation between their donor’s 
requirements, their own organizational aims and objectives, and the perspectives of journalists and 
other staff. However, in order to draw attention to causal mechanisms that are peculiar to news 
production, our analysis is also guided by a theoretical framework developed by Benson, Hesserus 
and Sedel (forthcoming) for analysing the power of media owners. Informed by the third way 
sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, Benson and his colleagues suggest that organizational values are 
produced and reproduced by interest-orientated journalists as they negotiate political and economic 
structures. This framework is, therefore, particularly useful for illuminating the ways in which 
stakeholders’ agency and struggles with one another are (at least partially) structured by their 
positioning within a particular organization and field of activity, with its own logics and forms of 
capital.  
We hypothesise that the forms of owner power Benson, Hesserus and Sedel highlight may 
also apply for donors, since they both often act as the ultimate gatekeeper of finances. Benson, 
Hesserus and Sedel’s (forthcoming) How Media Ownership Matters posits that there are four main 
ways in which owners exercise power within a news organisation. The first is by shaping 
journalists’ conceptualisation of their target audiences and audience-related objectives, as well as 
the ways in which they pursue them - through what they refer to as market adjustment (Benson, 
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forthcoming). For example, media owners may press journalists at a commercial news outlet to 
generate more financial revenue by modifying the format of news stories in order to appeal to a 
demographic which is particularly attractive to advertisers.  
The second and third modes of ownership power, according to Benson, Hesserus and Sedel 
(forthcoming) are political and business instrumentalism. This refers to the efforts of media owners 
to advance their political or economic interests through the news organisation they support by 
influencing journalists to publicise (or avoid publicising) events and topics related to the owners’ 
concerns. Benson (2016a) implies that such influences operate either by direct editorial control or 
through self-censorship. Given the frequent conflation of donor’s economic and political interests, 
we combine these into a single mode – political-economic instrumentalism.  
The final dimension of ownership power is the ability to influence the nature and level of 
commitment to public service values within a news organisation. Benson (2016a) suggests that 
this effect operates primarily through a combination of an owner’s influence over resource 
allocation and profit expectations. If owners expect or demand a high return to shareholders, for 
example, this may result in less resource for editorial production including expensive international 
reporting. It is these economic pressures which have been partly responsible for the general decline 
in foreign correspondents (Sambrook 2010). 
Benson (2016a) describes these modes of ownership power as both ‘ideal types’ which, in 
practice, usually work in tandem, and as operating according to, ‘a field-linked logic’. Following 
Bourdieu, Benson (2016a:32) defines a field as a, ‘semi-autonomous social world with its own 
distinctive logic of action and standards of excellence and virtue’. According to Benson (2016a), 
ownership power is mediated primarily by 1) the logics of the field that the media owner comes 
from and 2) the logics of the journalistic field.  
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The existing literature on donor-funded journalism 
Having outlined a model for explaining how donor power might operate, it is useful to establish 
how these influences may manifest themselves in news organisations’ outputs and production 
practices. In line with Benson, Hesserus and Sedel’s model, more optimistic writers tend to assume 
that donor funding allows news organisations to adopt a stronger public service commitment either 
by simply providing journalists with greater resources, or by alleviating, to some degree, profit 
expectations (Browne 2010). In one of the few empirical studies to begin to test this assumption, 
Nee (2011) finds that one of the most commonly cited benefits of donor funding amongst the 
leaders of the foundation-funded non-profit news outlets she interviewed, was that they had greater 
‘freedom to choose stories based on merit and public impact rather than popularity’ because they 
did not have to ‘pander to commercial interests to generate more traffic’. 
There is some, albeit limited, evidence to suggest that if news organisations with a 
commitment to international public service journalism are able to ‘choose stories based on merit’, 
rather than commercial considerations, they are more likely to produce analytical or in-depth 
coverage and include the voices of local citizens. For example, based on a comparative analysis of 
the international news coverage within 13 different countries, Chan and Lee (2013) found that, 
compared to commercial broadcasters, public service broadcasters are more likely to include 
characteristics of ‘analytical depth’, such as longer soundbites and social conflicts. Moreover, 
numerous content analyses have confirmed that international news organisations with a public 
service commitment to serve as the ‘voice of the voiceless’, such as Inter Press Service (IPS) and 
Al Jazeera, do indeed regularly cite a higher proportions of local citizens than other media 
(Figenschou 2013). Whilst none of this research actually isolates the effects of donor funding on 
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international public service journalism, it does at least give some indication of the likely 
consequences for journalistic outputs.  
It is also often assumed by academics, and asserted by news organisations and their 
respective funders, that philanthro-journalism is entirely independent from the direct editorial 
influence of donors. The need to safeguard journalists’ editorial independence was repeatedly 
stressed by IRIN journalists at the outset of this study, and by Jynwel’s founder, who stated that, 
‘they must maintain editorial integrity. That is going to be a core pillar of why people support 
IRIN’ (Low, cited in Hatcher 2014). In one of the few studies to investigate this issue empirically, 
Edmonds (2002:1) concludes that, ‘it is extremely rare to find a non-profit funder who received 
the final say on news content, set specific ideological criteria… or demanded the inclusion or 
exclusion of a specific point of view’. 
However, other work has highlighted a number of ways in which donor funding might 
indirectly affect a news organisations’ editorial content. It is commonly claimed, for example, that 
donor funding is likely to constrain journalists’ criticality by promoting self-censorship in 
circumstances where there is a clear correspondence between the subject-matter being funded and 
the donors’ interests (Feldman 2007). For example, the BMGF is one of the largest non-state 
donors in the field of international development but also one of the largest supporters of news 
coverage of this field. As a result, it has been accused of ‘operat[ing] a global patronage system 
whereby it is in effect buying the loyalty of influential actors… who might otherwise be expected 
to criticise it’ (Curtis 2016:10). This would be a clear case of political-economic instrumentalism. 
It is also frequently speculated that donor funding may constrain the more general sphere 
of legitimate controversy adopted by philanthro-journalism. Bunce (2016), for example, argues 
that this is one of the likely outcomes of the common donor requirement for news organisations to 
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generate ‘impacts’, such as instigating public deliberation, changing public opinion and producing 
substantive policy change. According to Konieczna and Powers (2016:6), an ‘orientation towards 
impact’ at The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists was, ‘encouraged, at least in 
part, by the organisation’s foundation funders’ and helped to shape one of their principal story 
selection criteria: ‘are they going to get a reaction?’. Such an orientation towards impact not only 
encourages journalists to adopt more outcome-focused role perceptions but also requires news 
organisations to engage in outreach to target audiences who can help them achieve impact, such 
as policy makers or practitioners. However, by encouraging journalists to engage in a closer, more 
symbiotic relationship with particular target audiences, this impact orientation may ultimately end 
up constraining the sphere of legitimate critique which journalists adopt, since they may not wish 
to offend the actors they hope to influence (Bunce 2016). According to Keller and Abelson 
(2015:20), this tendency for donors to link resource allocation with impact is itself the result of an, 
‘inherited… monitoring and evaluation philosophy… [which many foundations] have brought 
with them… from their work with NGOs and the international development field’. 
The final major proposition within the literature about the effects of donor funding is that 
journalists will be encouraged to reflect a world-view that aligns with their donor’s interests. 
Specifically, philanthro-journalism has been accused of adopting the ideology of ‘philanthro-
capitalism’, characterised by the naturalisation of pro-market ideologies, which are supportive of 
the current economic and political status quo of global capitalism from which most foundations 
have derived their wealth. For example, Wilkins and Enghel’s (2013:166) argue that, within the 
Gates-funded ‘Living Proof’ campaign, ‘the privileging of individual empowerment as an 
approach to social change… serves the agenda of privatised development within a neoliberal 
project’. In the case of humanitarian news, philanthro-journalism may adopt an elitist, technocratic 
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approach to social change which legitimises ameliorative rather than transformative forms of 
humanitarian action and fails to challenge power structures.  
There is evidence to suggest that this particular manifestation of political-economic 
instrumentalism is a product, not of deliberate manipulation, but of the interaction of the prevailing 
professional norms of the journalistic and donor-origin’s field. Wright (2014:195) has documented 
how managers at The Guardian argued that their editorial independence from the influence of 
donor funding could be guaranteed by finding, ‘a good match between sponsors’ agendas and their 
own editorial priorities’. As the Managing Editor explained, ‘well, it’s all around ‘fit’ between 
them and us… There is often common ground between our values and those of some foundations 
and companies’ (Ibid). Yet Edmonds (2002) has suggested that it is precisely via this search for 
‘common ground’ that political-economic instrumentalism operates. He argues that by subtly 
shifting the tone of coverage in ways that ‘fit’ with perceived areas of consensus, journalistic 
outputs may align themselves with the world-view of funders. Unfortunately, the only evidence  
we have regarding such ‘subtle shifts’ in the tone of the coverage of donor funded journalism 
involve anecdotal assessments of ‘before and after’ changes in media coverage (see Feldman 
2007). As Browne (2010:890) puts it, ‘there has not, as yet, been any comprehensive content 
analysis of the work produced by foundation-funded journalists and it would be unfair to jump to 
critical conclusions via anecdote’. 
In summary, the existing literature contains numerous, often conflicting ideas about the 
potential influences of donor funding on international public service journalism including; 
constraining criticality, modifying role perceptions and encouraging the adoption of a philanthro-
capitalist ideology but also maintaining editorial independence and allowing for more in-depth, 
analytical coverage which includes the voices of local citizens. At the same time it also signals the 
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importance of journalistic and ownership field logics and some of the forms of ownership power 
which Benson, Hesserus and Sedel (forthcoming) describe. However, this literature suffers from a 
number of limitations: it focuses almost entirely on US-based, local and national news 
organisations and is based largely on either anecdotal evidence or individual journalist testimonies. 
As a result, we know very little about how different field logics and forms of donor power interact 
with one another and what the effects of this are, particularly for international public service 
journalism.  
 
Methodology  
In order to address this important research gap we carried out an in-depth case study analysis of 
IRIN: an online news outlet which reports daily on humanitarian issues. IRIN’s content is 
disseminated digitally, through its website and social media channels. Its output tends to be used 
primarily by the humanitarian sector, but is also freely syndicated to partners including The 
Guardian and Al Jazeera. 
Our study took place between November 2014 and November 2015. From 1st January 2015 
onwards, immediately after their involvement with the UN ended, IRIN’s general operating costs 
became funded primarily by instalments of a $25 million pledge from the Jynwel Foundation. 
During this time, IRIN’s financial and legal affairs were administered by the London-based think 
tank - the Overseas Development Institute (ODI). Towards the end of 2015, IRIN’s financial and 
contractual arrangements with the Jynwel Foundation ended after the ODI became unwilling to 
transfer funds from Jynwel to IRIN.  Since then, IRIN has established itself as an independent non-
profit association and continued operating, without Jynwel funding. 
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The Jynwel Foundation was established in 2012 by Low Taek Jho (Jho Low), who is also 
its co-director and the Chief Executive of Jynwel Capital. Jho Low allegedly has connections to 
politicians in Malaysia including the Prime Minister, Najib Razak, and several US-based 
celebrities, such as Leonardo DiCaprio, Paris Hilton and Alicia Keys. But since 2014, several 
organisations covering Malaysian news had alleged that Jho Low was involved in 
misappropriating funds from a Malaysian sovereign wealth fund – 1MDB. These allegations 
received increasing international media attention throughout 2015 and in 2016 criminal 
investigations into the 1MDB case began in Australia, Hong Kong, Luxemburg, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand, UAE, the UK and the USA. 
For several reasons, IRIN appears to be an unusual case of philanthro-journalism as it was 
not only funded by a relatively new, Hong Kong-based, foundation but also one which became 
mired in a corruption scandal. However, in (author removed) we explain that these fraud 
allegations were not a key causal factor in shaping IRIN’s content or strategy for most of 2015. It 
was only in December 2015, when these allegations led to the news organisation parting company 
with the Jynwel foundation, that IRIN’s journalism was affected by a significant decline in 
resourcing. Prior to this, it was via the Jynwel Foundation’s values, pursuit of symbolic capital and 
influence over profit expectations, resource allocation and target audiences that they exerted 
(indirect) influence over IRIN. We have suggested above that these influences are much more 
common within cases of international philanthro-journalism (see also Benson 2016b; Bunce 2016; 
Pew 2013). In addition, IRIN’s small size, reliance on donors and precarity of funding are typical 
of the sub-field of international public service journalism. It is on this basis that we anticipate that 
the results of this analysis are likely to have some degree of wider relevance, at least within this 
sub-field. 
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However, this case was chosen, not because it is necessarily representative but because it 
is ‘revelatory’ (Yin 2003:42). It offers a rare but favorable set of conditions for addressing 
previously under-researched questions concerning the influence of donors. IRIN’s discrete 
transition from UN to Jynwel funding enables us to make direct comparisons between the content 
and production practices during each period. This is not possible in most circumstances. Moreover, 
the dominance of just one foundation, rather than multiple grants or donors, helps us to isolate and 
analyse the specific causal processes by which the influence of a single donor may have operated. 
It is also worth noting that, as the first in-depth case study of philanthro-journalism of its kind, ‘the 
descriptive information alone will be revelatory’ (Yin 2003:43). In summary, whilst the 
representativeness of this case can only be accurately revealed by further studies, the insights 
gained from this first, revelatory, case should inform the conduct and focus of those studies. 
In order to generate credible inferences about the effects of donor funding we adopted an 
integrative approach to causal analysis. This involves identifying both apparent causal effects and 
the processes which produced them (Rohlfing 2012:3). In this case, the potential effects of donor 
funding refers to changes in the form and focus of IRIN’s news outputs, the nature of their 
commitment to public service values and their prioritisation of them. These were investigated 
through a content analysis of all original, English-language outputs published by IRIN between 1st 
November 2014 and 30th November 2015. In order to establish if and how IRIN’s content changed 
over time, all qualifying items were coded according to the date, author, word length, format (1.0), 
topic (0.97), sources used (0.77) and the adoption of a ‘human interest’ (0.85) or ‘economic 
consequences’ (0.95) frame. These particular frames either ‘personalize… dramatize or 
“emotionalize” the news’ or focus on ‘the consequences… [events] will have economically’ 
(Semetko and Valkenburg 2000:96). The results of inter-coder reliability calculations (Cohen’s 
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Kappa) between the two researchers who conducted this analysis are given in brackets. Outputs 
were also coded according to their ‘communicative frame’ (0.92). Cottle and Rai (2011:169) 
describe these as, ‘conventionalized repertoires that routinely organize how news events and issues 
are publicly communicated and contested’. They identify 12 such frames including ‘contests’ 
between opposing views, and ‘campaigns’ in which articles actively advocate for particular 
causesi.  
Our investigation into the causal processes shaping IRIN’s content consisted of a 
combination of a newsroom ethnography, in-depth interviews and a document analysis. A total of 
25 semi-structured interviews, lasting between 30 and 90 minutes, were conducted with all 
contracted IRIN staff, between 1st January 2015 and 30th November 2015. IRIN’s Chief Executive 
and Managing Editor were both interviewed twice. Despite repeated requests, we were unable to 
interview any representatives of the Jynwel Foundation. As a result, our interpretations of their 
motivations and values are, unfortunately, based solely on secondary sources. The Director of 
Humanitarian Programmes at ODI, who had multiple interactions with Jynwel, was also 
interviewed twice.  
Our ethnographic research involved observing approximately four daily editorial meetings 
and one weekly planning meeting each month, between January 2015 and November 2015: 
amounting to a total of 47 meetings, lasting between 20 and 60 minutes each. Since most of IRIN’s 
staff lived and worked in different countries these meetings were held online, via Skype. IRIN’s 
newsroom was also virtual, consisting of a private discussion space on Slack - a cloud-based, team 
collaboration platform, which we also had access to. We also observed IRIN’s two-day annual 
strategy meeting in February 2015. All data concerning causal processes was collated in a case 
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study database, alongside every public and internal document produced by IRIN and all news 
reports about either Jynwel or IRIN published during our sample period. 
The first stage of our analysis involved producing a case description, validated by IRIN’s 
management, which showed the changes over time in IRIN’s content, each month, for every 
variable within our content analysis. The second stage involved a thematic analysis of the material 
within our case study database. This entailed identifying and examining all evidence which 
indicated the presence or absence of the modes of donor power and other intervening variables 
hypothesised by Benson, Hesserus and Sedel’s (forthcoming) and their connection to the changes 
over time in IRIN’s content. What follows is a description of the three most significant shifts in 
IRIN’s journalism, followed by an account of the causal processes which appeared to produce 
them. 
 
Results: Causal effects  
1. The quantity, length and format of outputs  
In early 2015 there were rapid and significant changes in the quantity, length and format of IRIN’s 
outputs. Figure 1 shows that despite substantial declines in their budgets and staffing levels, the 
number of outputs IRIN produced each month increased significantly in the first few months of 
2015 - almost doubling from 38 outputs in December 2014 to 73 outputs in March 2015. This was 
a direct consequence of the Managing Editor requiring each journalist to produce ‘one product, 
every day’ (23.6.15), in order to help, ‘build an audience’ (Middle East Editor 30.1.15). This target 
represented a dramatic shift from when IRIN was a UN-OCHA project, when the focus was on 
‘quality… not volume’ (former Editor in Chief 20.3.15).  
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[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Alongside an increase in the quantity of outputs was a decrease in their average length. 
Prior to 2015, IRIN’s outputs were characterised by their Middle East Editor as, ‘tend[ing] to be 
500 words longer than they deserved’ (30.1.15), because, as IRIN’s News Editor explained, ‘there 
wasn’t a really big incentive to cut them’ (20.2.15). In contrast, the editorial guidelines issued by 
IRIN’s senior managers in January 2015 advised journalists that, ‘we want to see more short pieces 
(300-400 words) and average size pieces (800 words)’. So, as Figure 1 shows, the length of IRIN 
news items declined sharply in the first few months of 2015: from an average of 1329 words in 
December 2014, to 888 words in January 2015.  
From January 2015 onwards, all IRIN journalists and editors were also required to post on 
social media channels at least once a day and a target was set for IRIN to increase average monthly 
users and social traffic by 100% in its first year. IRIN adopted a deliberate policy of recruiting new 
staff with, and training existing staff in, skills relevant to multimedia and digital design. Indeed, 
one of the first new appointments in 2015 was to the newly created post of Social Media Editor. 
Journalists were also repeatedly encouraged to produce content that was suitable for sharing and 
consumption via social media. The newly appointed Social Media Editor regularly made 
suggestions to editors and journalists regarding how to make their outputs more marketable. 
Finally, during the first three months of 2015, IRIN staff were repeatedly encouraged on 
Slack and in editorial meetings to ‘experiment’ and be ‘more creative’ (Slack 19.3.15) in the format 
and presentation of their outputs. As the Middle East Editor explained, ‘for the first time since I’ve 
been at IRIN, I’m being encouraged just to try stuff out’ (30.1.15). As a result, the average 
proportion of outputs not in the form of either a conventional news item or weekly ‘top picks’ 
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increased from 8%, in the last two months of 2014, to 20% of all outputs between January 2015 to 
November 2015. This included guest columns, editorials, briefings and visual features – many of 
which were introduced for the first time.  
 
2. The nature of IRIN’s public service commitments 
Secondly, there were important changes in the forms of public service journalism that IRIN sought 
to provide. When IRIN was a UN-OCHA project, its principal form of public service was 
providing longer-form, in-depth coverage. As the Managing Editor explained, ‘our selling point 
[was] that we were adding [value] to the quick news stories that tell you what’s happened and we 
try to explain why they’ve happened and the context in which they’ve happened’ (22.1.15). In 
2015, however, this was not emphasised as strongly. Instead, the public purpose of reporting on 
humanitarian issues or crises neglected by mainstream media, was not only retained but given 
seemingly greater emphasis. This purpose was foregrounded in internal documents, public 
statements by Jynwel and IRIN’s management, interviews with almost all IRIN staff and even 
within some of IRIN’s outputs. In the draft of IRIN’s Statutes in March 2015, for example, IRIN’s 
charitable purpose was described as being, ‘to improve understanding of natural or man-made 
humanitarian emergencies, particularly those less reported or overlooked’.  
The most significant change in the nature of IRIN’s public service orientation, though, 
concerned their watchdog function. It has been widely reported that when IRIN was a UN-OCHA 
project there were, as one interviewee put it, significant ‘limitations on IRIN’s editorial 
independence’. This resulted in what various interviewees described as a more general tendency 
to produce ‘softish leads on the story’ and ‘not writ[e]… anything too provocative… [about] the 
UN’. By contrast, when IRIN left the UN it repeatedly asserted in public statements that it would, 
18 
 
‘be better positioned to critically examine the multi-billion dollar humanitarian aid industry’ (Press 
Release 20.11.2014). A new position covering the ‘aid policy’ beat was created to produce, ‘stories 
that push the industry forward by forcing it to confront critical issues’ (Slack 30.7.15). Most IRIN 
journalists also perceived their coverage to be more critical, with one describing himself as, ‘less 
concerned about upsetting member states, because they’re not our member states any more’.  
However, there were limits to the extent to which IRIN adopted this particular role. Figure 
2 shows that the percentage of IRIN outputs that qualified as adopting either an 
‘expose/investigation’ or ‘campaigning’ communicative frame increased only marginally in 2015, 
from an average of 4% of outputs in November and December 2014 to 6.5% between January 
2015 and November 2015. Moreover, the form of critique that IRIN offered in 2015 was repeatedly 
described as ‘constructive’, rather than severely critical. In its 2015 Vision Statement, for example, 
IRIN describes its coverage as leading to ‘constructive dialogue, not scandalous headlines’.  
But although adopting the role of a constructive watchdog may have placed some 
ideological limits on IRIN’s content, there was no evidence to suggest that IRIN began to adopt a 
pro-market ideology. The data in Table 1 shows that whilst the proportion of IRIN news items 
adopting an ‘economic consequences’ frame did increase noticeably in the first three months of 
2015 to a high of 12%, it subsequently declined to an average of just 5% in the following eight 
months. Table 1 also shows that at no point did representatives of either local or international 
businesses make up more than 2% of all sources cited within a single month.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
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Alongside changes in their role perceptions, the journalists at IRIN had a new and more 
diverse understanding of their audience. In 2015, most staff described IRIN’s target audience as 
having expanded to include those, ‘peripherally involved in the [humanitarian] sector’ (Managing 
Editor 23.6.15) or ‘people that are interested in the subject’ (Middle East Editor 30.1.15). 
However, the Jynwel Foundation frequently described IRIN’s audience as being the ‘general 
public’ (cited in Hatcher 2014) and the draft IRIN Foundation statues in March 2015 referred to 
an ambition to, ‘reach as many people as possible’. Further target audiences mentioned by different 
individuals included affected audiences, policy makers, other news organisations, donors and 
celebrities. IRIN’s ‘Editor-at-Large’ (20.3.15), for example, stated that he, ‘want[ed] to be relevant 
to the people in the countries that we are reporting on’, whilst the Social Media Editor (29.5.15) 
said that, ‘for us it’s important to still reach that kind of ‘impact’, in inverted commas, audience, 
so decision-makers and policy-makers’.  
 
3. The prioritisation of public service values  
The final significant change in IRIN’s journalism concerned an apparent temporary decline, 
between December 2014 and February 2015, in the prioritisation of public service values. Table 1 
shows that, during this three month period, the percentage of IRIN outputs adopting a 'human 
interest' frame and those citing local citizens was significantly lower than for any other month 
during the sample period. Providing a ‘platform for the voices of the powerless’ (Slack 27.5.15) 
was understood to be a key public service value for every IRIN journalists. 
Similarly, Figure 2 shows that, in the same three month period, the proportion of IRIN 
outputs that were ‘reportage’ declined significantly. Cottle and Rai (2011:181) describe reportage 
as, ‘a communicative frame that… [provides] detailed background, context and analysis; in situ 
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observation, first-hand testimony and/or experiential accounts of events’. It is associated with 
public service because it, ‘attempt[s] to generate deeper understanding and insights into current 
news events’ (Cottle and Rai 2011:179). Figure 2 also reveals that, during these three months, 
more simplistic, ‘conflictual’ communicative frames, including ‘dominant’, ‘contest’ and 
‘contention’ frames, reached their highest levels within the sample period - making up between 
39% and 43% of all IRIN outputs.  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
In summary, the principal changes to IRIN’s content and professional norms in 2015 were: 
an increase in the quantity, range of formats and use of social media and a decrease in the average 
length of articles; the foregrounding of the role of constructive watchdog and rectifier of media 
inattention; an increase in the breadth and diversity of their target audience and a temporary 
decrease in the prioritisation of public service values. The following section explores the multiple 
factors that drove these changes.  
 
Results: Causal processes  
Our analysis generated no evidence to suggest that the Jynwel Foundation had any direct influence 
over IRIN’s editorial decision making. Representatives of Jynwel had no direct contact with IRIN 
journalists, never suggested any specific investigations or stories, were never shown content prior 
to publication and were very rarely mentioned on Slack or in editorial meetings. Furthermore, 
whilst IRIN did not cover any issues relevant to the activities and interests of the Jynwel 
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Foundation or Jynwel Capital, there was no evidence to suggest that this was driven by a perceived 
conflict of interest, rather than by a view that such issues simply didn’t fall within IRIN’s remit.  
However, Jynwel did exert some indirect influence over IRIN via a combination of their 
‘insist[ence] on visibility’ (Managing Editor 23.6.15), influence over revenue expectations and 
particular professional values. As we reveal below, though, each of these influences operated in 
tandem with each other, as well as with other factors, to shape IRIN’s work. The interplay of these 
factors is reviewed through a discussion of 1) maximising audience reach 2) competing field logics 
and 3) journalistic values.  
 
1. Maximising audience reach  
The most significant factor behind many of the changes to IRIN’s work was new pressure to 
maximize audience reach. This included a considerable shift of resources towards activities 
intended to help IRIN reach its new target audiences more efficiently. Efforts to maximise 
audience reach included a greater emphasis on social media, as well as changes in the quantity, 
length and format of IRIN’s outputs. The decline in average article length, for example, was said 
to be important for enhancing the ‘readability’ (Editor-at-Large, 20.3.15) and ‘relevance’ (Senior 
Sub-editor, 15.6.15) of IRIN’s outputs. New formats were introduced to help reach key audiences; 
these were described as being, ‘a very clear expression of a brand’ (Managing Editor, 23.6.15). 
This new focus on maximising audience reach was also linked to a temporary decline in the 
prioritisation of public service values between December 2014 and February 2015. As the 
Managing Editor (23.6.15) explained, ‘in our attempt to be… more relevant on a day-to-day basis, 
I think we’ve swung a little too far in chasing after news stories of the day instead of doing our 
own original, unique stuff’.  
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This emphasis on audience reach was driven partly by the Jynwel Foundation’s political 
and economic interests, and by the logic of the field of philanthro-capitalism within which the 
donor appeared to operate. One of the conditions of Jynwel’s funding was that IRIN was required 
to aim to generate, at a minimum, a third of its budget from ‘earned revenues’, within 5 years. 
Although such commercial expectations are common for foundation-funded non-profit news start-
ups, most struggle to generate more than 25% of their revenue outside of donor grants (Pew 2013). 
As a result, achieving this degree of revenue diversification represented a significant challenge for 
IRIN and required it to invest heavily in news products and activities that would help expand its 
audience.    
According to Benson (2016b:15), requirements regarding commercial sustainability derive 
from the dominance of the economic market field within most foundations, which entails, ‘a 
fundamental ideological commitment to a market-led solution’. The accounts Jho Low gave 
journalists of his decision to invest in IRIN suggest that such a logic was also dominant at the 
Jynwel Foundation. Jho Low repeatedly emphasised his intention to, ‘ensure IRIN’s financial 
viability’, asserting that this would only be possible if IRIN combined, ‘the intensity of a business 
with the integrity of an NGO’ (cited in Bond 2014).  
The Jynwel Foundation also had self-interested reasons for wanting IRIN to expand its 
audience and visibility. At a time when Jho Low was facing increasing scrutiny for his apparent 
role in an unfolding corruption scandal in Malaysia, IRIN’s efforts to raise its profile had the 
potential to offer Jho Low some reputational benefits through the accrual of symbolic capital. 
Whilst Jho Low made no explicit public statements about this, several IRIN journalists speculated 
that Jynwel’s support for international public service journalism was motivated by, ‘PR reasons as 
much as anything else’ (Head of Special Projects 22.5.15). Indeed, reputational enhancement was 
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an important element of other organisations’ involvement with IRIN. For example, IRIN’s Chief 
Executive (16.1.15) suggested that UN-OCHA had gained, ‘soft power… [or] a brand-enhancing 
equity value’ from supporting IRIN. Similarly, ODI’s Director of Humanitarian Programmes 
(10.4.15) said that the think tank had gained ‘gratitude from the sector, for keeping IRIN going’. 
In fact, one of the main reasons why the relationship between IRIN and Jynwel ultimately ended 
was that the ODI were no longer willing to be involved because of the growing potential 
reputational risks of being associated with Jho Low (see authored removed). 
However, this heightened concern for expanding audiences was driven, not just by the 
donor’s interests and apparent professional values but by a desire expressed by all IRIN staff to 
‘source different revenue streams as soon as possible’ (Head of Special Projects 22.5.15) in order 
to establish their (actual and perceived) editorial independence. As the Managing Editor (22.1.15) 
put it, ‘it’s risky having most of your funding tied to one donor. It makes you very vulnerable – 
both financially and in terms of your editorial independence’. This strong adherence to the 
journalistic norm of independence and impartiality was reinforced by their previous experience as 
a UN-OCHA project, when IRIN staff perceived their editorial integrity to have been 
compromised. In summary, it was the confluence of multiple factors – stemming from both the 
donor and from within IRIN - that led to changes in IRIN’s work. 
 
2. Competing agendas and field logics  
When IRIN was funded by the Jynwel Foundation, IRIN worked in, and engaged with, three fields: 
journalism, humanitarianism and philanthro-capitalism. Each of these fields has its own dominant 
logic and ways of doing things. IRIN’s work needed to be compatible with all three. Many of the 
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changes in IRIN’s work can be seen as the result of journalists’ efforts to negotiate these often 
competing logics, and the multiple agendas that stemmed from them. 
 
The nature of IRIN’s public service commitment  
IRIN journalists’ prioritisation of in-depth coverage reduced somewhat in early 2015 because it 
was incompatible with the need to expand the audience and diversify revenue.  In contrast, their 
public service commitment to report on neglected issues and crises was increasingly emphasised 
because it served multiple agendas simultaneously. For IRIN journalists, drawing attention to 
neglected crises corresponded with the humanitarian principle of human equivalence. As IRIN’s 
Chief Executive (16.1.2015) explained, ‘the humanitarian value I think behind our practice... is 
that we believe suffering is equal wherever and that… [it is] equally deserving of attention and 
response’. In addition, telling unreported stories helped IRIN achieve impact amongst multiple 
stakeholders, which made it more attractive to potential donors (Aly 2016), as well as helping the 
organisation generate the symbolic capital sought by Jynwel.  
The need to satisfy multiple agendas – and negotiate competing field logics - also helps to 
explain the increased emphasis on constructive watchdog journalism at IRIN. Some individual 
IRIN journalists were driven by the tradition of adversarial reporting in the journalistic field, which 
places a strong emphasis on ‘speaking truth to power’. One wrote on Slack that they chose to work 
for IRIN because they were, ‘really genuinely excited about the possibility to kick up shit by 
ripping into one of the most unaccountable, unchallenged parts of the global economy’ (27.5.15). 
In contrast, other journalists suggested that the experience of operating with, ‘a kind of… self-
censorship’ as a UN-OCHA project continued to shape their role perceptions in 2015. As one 
relatively new IRIN staff member put it, ‘I think that’s something that… other… [staff] are still 
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coming out of’. The adoption of the role of a constructive watchdog appears to have been, at least 
partly, a consequence of a compromise between these two competing values.  
The role of a constructive watchdog may also have been a compromise between two 
contradictory pressures from the Jynwel Foundation. On the one hand, Jho Low’s values; Low 
repeatedly referred to his philosophy of, ‘disruptive philanthropy’, which appeared to support 
IRIN’s adoption of a critical watchdog function. In an interview with the New York Times, for 
example, Jho Low stated that whilst IRIN’s new pursuit of ‘hard questions and critical reporting… 
may be painful short term for certain states… long term, we should be clear that it achieves the 
overarching agenda of saving human lives’ (Cited in Cumming-Bruce 2014).  On the other hand, 
there was evidence to suggest that the Jynwel Foundation was reluctant for IRIN to be overly 
critical. Jynwel’s representative reportedly expressed anxiety at the idea of IRIN performing a 
watchdog function. It is unclear whether this apparent anxiety stemmed from concerns over the 
potential implications for Jynwel’s reputation if IRIN pursued adversarial reporting, or from an 
incompatibility between IRIN’s and Jynwel’s beliefs about journalism’s role in promoting 
transparency and accountability. Either way, it appears that the contradictions between Jynwel’s 
interests and apparent values ultimately resulted in a preference for IRIN to adopt a constructive, 
rather than an especially critical, watchdog role. 
 
Target Audiences 
The need to satisfy multiple agendas and negotiate competing field logics also helps to explain the 
shift in target audiences that occurred at IRIN. The Jynwel Foundations’ accrual of reputational 
benefits relied upon IRIN generating symbolic capital, either by ‘impacting’ policy makers, 
influencing the mainstream media agenda, raising their profile amongst the general public or 
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getting noticed by certain celebrities. At the same time, though, IRIN was also required to generate 
economic capital, by building its existing humanitarian audience, in order to meet the profit 
expectations introduced partly as a result of the donor’s field logic.  
But again, these competing pressures were themselves mediated by the journalists, 
operating in accordance with their own norms and values. The norms of neutrality and impartiality 
within IRIN encouraged the pursuit of diverse revenue streams (as noted above). However, these 
same norms also constrained the forms of revenue generation IRIN staff felt able to pursue. For 
example, IRIN’s Chief Executive (Slack 31.3.15) stated that none of the IRIN staff were ‘very 
comfortable with the idea [of] sponsored content’. As a result, IRIN was frequently described as 
being, ‘not quite there yet on the business model’ (Social Media Editor 29.5.5). The Head of 
Special Projects (22.5.15) admitted that she was, ‘still not a hundred per cent clear what our core 
businesses [is] and for which audience’. 
Finally, the existence of multiple target audiences was a product of the competing visions 
of IRIN’s future held by both Jynwel and IRIN’s management. As the Director of Humanitarian 
Programmes at the ODI put it, ‘I’m not sure there is a particularly clear vision on either side… but 
they clearly want something different’ (31.11.15). This divergence of opinion stemmed from a 
clear discrepancy between IRIN management’s adherence to journalistic field logics and what 
IRIN’s Chief Executive (16.1.15) described as the ‘culture [of] philanthro-capitalism [and] 
philanthro-entrepreneurialism’ at the Jynwel Foundation. Indeed, in his public statements about 
IRIN, Jho Low repeatedly describes the organisation, not in journalistic terms, but as, ‘an NGO… 
work[ing] hand-in-hand with the major media in the common objective of dealing with 
humanitarian crises’ (cited in Bond 2014).  
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IRIN’s Managing Editor (23.6.15) described the numerous ‘cultural [shifts] in mindset’ 
that were required to ‘straddle these very different universes’ as being ‘very challenging’.  
 
One day you’re dealing with a reporter in Guinea who might have Ebola and the next day 
you’re talking about how to get George Clooney to your event. 
 
These ‘cultural differences’ (Chief Executive 3.11.15) also gradually led to a breakdown in trust 
and communication, which made it increasingly difficult to establish a common consensus on 
IRIN’s future. IRIN’s Chief Executive stated that this lack of communication meant that, ‘it was 
really unclear whether we had the same vision or not’ (Editorial meting 3.11.15). 
 
3. Journalistic values  
The final key issue concerns the extent to which the personal values and role perceptions 
of the journalists who worked at IRIN were able to influence news content. There is evidence to 
suggest that at least two of the key changes we observed in IRIN’s journalism were driven 
primarily by decisions made by IRIN’s editorial management. Firstly, IRIN managers’ pursuit of 
a more diverse audience (and funding base) exceeded the expectations and requirements of the 
Jynwel Foundation. Jho Low was quoted in the Financial Times as saying that IRIN, ‘should kick-
start with a strong enough capital base that they don’t need to worry about money [initially]’ (Bond 
2014). Despite this, the Managing Editor described herself as being ‘still hesitant’ to be so reliant 
on one donor’ (23.6.15). This suggests that IRIN managements’ values may have been the key 
driver of IRIN’s efforts to expand its audience and revenue.  
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Secondly, the ‘readjustment’ in the prioritisation of public service values that occurred 
from March 2015 onwards was the result of a deliberate shift in editorial strategy by IRIN’s 
management. As the Managing Editor explained: whilst ‘chasing after news stories of the day’ 
may have been ‘necessary’ at the time, ‘now it’s time to kind of re-balance’ (23.6.15). This 
editorial ‘re-balancing’ suggests that IRIN’s management had sufficient autonomy to regulate the 
extent to which IRIN prioritised public service values - at least in terms of the framing and focus 
of IRIN’s outputs. As the Head of Special Projects put it, ‘I think we are still grappling with what 
stories fit within our remit and what don’t. But there is no doubt at all that we can do any stories 
that we want to… The debate is internal and not with an external fund-master’ (12.3.15). 
It is important to note, however, that the decline in the prioritisation of public service 
content from December 2014 to February 2015 was linked, not only to editorial strategy, but also 
to significant organisational changes taking place at IRIN at this time. In particular, uncertainty 
over commissioning budgets and disruption to the stringer network meant that IRIN staff were 
producing a much higher proportion of outputs than usual. This is significant because, compared 
to stringers, staff were less likely to author longer, news items, which included local citizens as 
sources and which adopted human interest and ‘reportage’ frames. 
It is also important to note that these changes introduced by individual journalists may only 
have been possible because they did not contradict the donors’ apparent interests or values. 
Furthermore, the apparent autonomy of IRIN’s management may be explained by the fact that the 
immediate interests of the Jynwel Foundation, like many donors, were served by encouraging IRIN 
to generate the symbolic capital associated with highly valued forms of public service journalism. 
Given that editorial independence is a key public service value, efforts to interfere with news 
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production would ultimately be incompatible with the interests of the Jynwel Foundations. Put 
simply, it was in the interests of the donor not to interfere or to be seen to be interfering.   
 
Conclusion  
This study has sought to investigate how donor funding influences the journalism it supports. In 
the case of IRIN, our analysis suggests that donor power operated indirectly and always in concert 
(or conflict) with the dominant professional values within the news organisation. This complex 
interaction of influences resulted in a focus on maximising audience reach which led to an increase 
in the quantity, range of formats and use of social media and a decrease in the average length of 
articles. Our results also show that although IRIN’s prioritisation of public service values was 
initially compromised by this concert of factors, this was subsequently reversed by a deliberate 
shift in editorial strategy. Perhaps the greatest influence of donor power was in helping to 
determine which forms of content were most highly-valued: namely, rectifying media inattention 
and acting as a constructive watchdog.   
Since this is the first in-depth case study of philanthro-journalism it is not possible to 
ascertain precisely how common these features of donor power are. However, this study does allow 
us to make a number of more general observations about the operation of donor power, which can 
inform future research. Firstly, our analysis highlights the importance of both journalistic agency 
and contextual variables, which are often under-emphasised in the research literature in favor of 
macro level factors, such as economic imperatives or political pressures (see Feldman 2007; 
Browne 2010). For example, whilst IRIN’s increased concern for generating impact may have 
placed some ideological limits on their content, IRIN certainly did not begin to adopt a pro-market 
ideology supportive of philanthro-capitalism. Indeed, perhaps the most striking feature of our 
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analysis was the over-riding significance of historically formed, individual values and dispositions 
and national and transnational level journalistic field logics, in mediating all forms of donor power.  
Secondly, this analysis has begun to support our contention that Benson, Hesserus and 
Sedel’s (forthcoming) framework can serve as an appropriate model for explaining the main 
processes by which donor influence operates, at least in the case of international public service 
journalism. However, the unanticipated influence of organizational changes within IRIN reminds 
us of the need to remain attentive to contrary explanations. In addition, whilst Benson, Hesserus 
and Sedel’s model implies that power derives primarily from the agency of individual owners, our 
analysis suggests that donor power can also stem from the need for funding more generally. IRIN’s 
concern for maximising audience reach, for example, was more of a response to the imagined 
desires of potential donors, rather than a response to their existing donor’s requirements. In which 
case, future research should seek to clarify where donor power comes from in different contexts, 
as well as whether donor funding works via similar causal chains for nationally and locally oriented 
public service journalism. 
Finally, this analysis has highlighted how donor power and journalistic and donor field 
logics can interact in both complimentary and contradictory ways, with each other but also within 
themselves. For example, whilst the dominant journalistic field logics worked with both the 
donor’s field logic and political and economic interests to produce a clear focus on maximizing 
audience reach, they also created internal contradictions that led to differences of opinion over 
IRIN’s target audience. This complex interplay of influences suggests that the operation of donor 
power in this case can be understood through paradigm of ‘contradictions’. Freedman 
(2014:26.118) contends that contradictions are a ‘basic operating principle’ of capitalism and 
argues that the media are, ‘fully implicated in this environment and suffused by contradictions 
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between, for example, the desire for ‘consensus’ and the pursuit of difference, between a 
professional commitment to hold power to account and an institutional entanglement with power’. 
Indeed, these two particular contradictions help to explain the principal forms of public service 
commitment IRIN adopted - rectifying media inattention and acting as a constructive watchdog. 
Similarly, competing demands to generate both economic and symbolic capital are an expression 
of the contradiction within capitalism, ‘between socially useful production and production for 
exchange’ (Freedman 2014:26). This suggests that future research should also be attuned to the 
possibility that it is the contradictory dynamics of donor power that are central to both its operation 
and contestation. 
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Figure 1: Change over time in the quantity, format and average word length of IRIN 
 outputs 
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Figure 2: Proportion of IRIN outputs each month (excluding ‘top picks’) which adopted a 
particular ‘communicative frame’. 
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  Percentage of 
outputs 
adopting a 
'human 
interest' frame 
Percentage of 
outputs adopting 
an ‘economic 
consequences’ 
frame 
Percentage 
of articles 
citing local 
citizens 
Percentage of 
articles citing 
local 
businesses 
Percentage of 
articles citing 
international 
businesses 
Nov-14 13% 4% 59% 0% 1% 
Dec-14 6% 0% 37% 2% 1% 
Jan-15 7% 4% 36% 0% 2% 
Feb-15 10% 8% 34% 1% 2% 
Mar-15 17% 12% 42% 0% 0% 
Apr-15 33% 6% 61% 0% 1% 
May-15 17% 7% 53% 0% 0% 
Jun-15 25% 6% 59% 1% 0% 
Jul-15 19% 6% 55% 0% 0% 
Aug-15 17% 4% 61% 1% 1% 
Sep-15 18% 4% 68% 1% 0% 
Oct-15 22% 3% 49% 0% 1% 
Nov-15 16% 2% 40% 1% 0% 
AVERAGE 17% 5% 50% 1% 1% 
 
Table 1: Change over time in the percentage of IRIN outputs (excluding ‘top picks’) 
adopting different frames and citing different sources 
 
i We would like to thank our research assistant Jessie Hagen for her dedicated and thorough 
contribution to the content analysis. 
                                                          
